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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is designed to further the
ends of international justice by ensuring effective prosecution of serious
crimes at the international level.' It is intended to contribute to the "last-
ing respect for and the enforcement of international justice."2 It is also
supposed to provide a reliable and fair forum for prosecuting Heads of
State and the perpetrators of particularly heinous international crimes.3
However, a reading of the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC, as it
has been adopted reveals a loophole which can be easily exploited by
States that are either powerful, acting in bad faith, or both.
To the extent that the purpose of the ICC is strictly prosecution of
heinous international crimes, its jurisdictional reach is inadequate.4 The
Rome Statute requires either a nationality or territorial connection with a
ratifying State Party for jurisdiction over an individual.5 Alternately, a
case must be referred to the ICC by the Security Council under its
* J.D. University of Michigan Law School, expected 2003; B.A. University of Texas
at Austin, 1999. The author would like to thank Emily Dawson, Michael Ellison, and Beatrice
Tice.
I. E.g., General Overview of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
[hereinafter Overview of the Rome Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/generaUoverview.htm.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiatics on the Establishment of an International Crimnal Court on 17
July 1998, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute].
3. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002).
4. See Overview of the Rome Statute, supra note 1.
5. Rome Statute art. 12.
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Chapter VII jurisdiction.6 Bad actors who control internationally power-
ful States are thus made immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC.
A supplemental function of the Rome Statute is to provide the first
treaty-based definition of crimes against humanity] Unfortunately, the
definition encapsulated in the Rome Statue is an uneasy compromise
between two positions that leaves the actual definition unclear.8
This Note will examine problems that arise from the language of the
Rome Statute itself. Part II will examine the potential strategic uses of
the Rome Statute's jurisdictional aspects.9 It will also examine how the
fairness concerns raised by this potential usage are exacerbated when the
potential State abuser is a permanent member of the Security Council.'
Part III will look at the language of the Rome Statute's definition of
crimes against humanity." It will also examine the various and varying
interpretations of this language by the scholars and commentators who
have examined the issue.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION BY THE ICC
The International Criminal Court is designed to be an independent,
permanent tribunal headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands.'2 Since the
International Criminal Court was created by treaty, its jurisdictional
reach had to be negotiated among the various State Parties. The crimes
over which the ICC has jurisdiction were relatively easy to negotiate.
The actual mechanism for granting the Court jurisdiction, however, was
the subject of a great deal of debate.1
4
6. Rome Statute art. 13.
7. John F. Murphy, The Quivering Gulliver.- U.S. Views on a Permanent International
Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 45, 54 (2000).
8. Those scholars and commentators who have addressed this issue have muddied the
waters further with their contradictory views on both the definitions of critical words and the
jurisdictional threshold requirement. This will be discussed at greater length infra.
9. See Rome Statute arts. 5-21.
10. At this time, only France and Great Britain have ratified the Rome Statute. Ratifica-
tion Status of the Rome Statute, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2003).
II. Rome Statute art. 7.
12. Rome Statute art. 3(l).
13. Ruth Wedgewood, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Achiev-
ing a Wider Consensus Through the "Ithaca Package", 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 535, 535-37
(1999). The exception is the crime of aggression. It was agreed that aggression should be
included in the list of crimes under the Court's jurisdiction. However, the delegates could not
agree on the definition of the crime. Id. at 539-41. The delegates therefore included aggres-
sion in the Rome Statute pending later definition. Rome Statute art. 5(2).
14. In my discussion of this area, I omit the principle of complimentarity because it has
been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. The principle of complementarity allows the ICC to
take jurisdiction of a case only if I) national courts are "unwilling or unable" to take the case;
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The United States favored a plan whereby all prosecutions must be
referred to the ICC through the Security Council, or at least that the Se-
curity Council should have a veto on prosecutions.'5 This was an attempt
to make the treaty politically feasible in the United States Congress,
which was primarily concerned that United States servicemen and ser-
vicewomen would be prosecuted in the ICC for political reasons.16
Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), and Zell Miller (D-Ga.) explained their
opposition to the ICC as follows:
The ICC is without supervision or oversight. It is only a matter
of time until some nations, seeking to divert attention from their
prior support of terrorist groups, will be trying to use the court to
blur the distinctions between the terrorists and U.S. counter-
terrorist efforts by trumping up charges against members of the
armed forces of the United States. 7
If the Rome Statute granted what amounted to a United States veto on
any prosecution, the United States delegation hoped that Congress would
be willing to ratify it.'"
Other States were not blind to the United States delegation's intent.
Those States that were not permanent members of the Security Council
especially resented this attempt. 9 Many of these States felt that the ICC
should have automatic jurisdiction on those crimes committed by citi-
zens of States that became parties to the ICC.20 On the other hand, these
States accepted that United States' participation in the ICC was neces-
sary to make it a viable institution." What emerged was an uneasy
compromise that leaves many holes for States to behave strategically and
gives a strategic-minded State no incentive to ratify the treaty.
2
The jurisdictional requirements of the International Criminal Court
give States that commit crimes against their own citizens the incentive to
simply circumvent the Court's jurisdiction by refusing to ratify the
2) the case reaches a certain level of gravity; and 3) the person has not been previously tried in
a valid court for the same offense. LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MIL-
LENNIUM 119 (2002).
15. James Podgers, Launch Time: The International Criminal Court Becomes Reality







22. See Alex Ward, Breaking the Sovereignty Bdrrier: The United States and the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1123 (2001).
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treaty. 3 A State with a position on the U.N. Security Council essentially
guarantees its citizens immunity from prosecution as long as it refuses to
become a party to the Rome Statute.
A case may be referred to the International Criminal Court in three
ways. First, a State Party to the treaty may refer the case to the Prosecu-
tor. 5 Second, the Security Council may refer it to the Prosecutor under
26its Chapter VII duties. Finally, the Prosecutor may begin prosecution of
a crime on his or her own after having received permission from the Pre-
Trial Chamber.
In the case of prosecutions initiated by a State Party or the ICC
Prosecutor, the ICC has jurisdiction to take the case only if the crime
occurred in the territory of a State Party or if the alleged perpetrator is a
national of a State Party.28 A State that is not a party may consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICC "with respect to the crime in question" by lodging
a declaration with the registrar to that effect.29 This language appears to
allow a State to consent to prosecution by the ICC for only the specific
crime alleged to have been committed by its national or to have taken
place on its territory.3
This triad approach to jurisdiction creates large areas where States
can use the ICC strategically. As long as any State does not consent to be
bound by the Rome Statute, it can have the best of both worlds. The ICC
has no jurisdiction over that State's citizens who commit genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes as long as they do so within the
boundaries of States that are not members of the ICC.3' In contrast, if a
person who is a national of a State Party to the ICC commits genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes within a State that is not part of
23. Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court: The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 57,
71 (2001).
24. See Rome Statute art. 13.
25. Rome Statute art. 14.
26. Id. art. 13. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is entitled "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." U.N. CHAR-
TER ch. VII, available at http://www.un.org/overview/charter/chapter7.html. The Rome Statue
specifically gives the referral power to the Security Council under its Chapter VII powers.
Rome Statute art. 13.
27. Id. art. 15. This is known as an investigation proprio motu. Id. The Pre-Trial Cham-
ber is comprised of judges elected under article 36 of the Rome Statute and assigned only to
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Id. art. 39. The majority of the judges elected to the Pre-Trial Chamber
are supposed to have criminal trial experience. Id.
28. Id. art. 4(2); see also SADAT, supra note 14, at 105.
29. Rome Statute art. 12(3). The registry is the administrative branch of the ICC. The
registrar is the head of the registry and the "principal administrative officer of the court."
Rome Statute art. 43.
30. Summers, supra note 23, at 72-73.
31. Rome Statute art. 12(2).
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the ICC, the ICC will have jurisdiction over them. 2 A State that is not a
party to the Rome Statute cannot initiate the prosecution of crimes by a
national of an ICC Member State.33 However, article 14 of the Rome
Statute allows any State to initiate prosecution, whether they have any
connection to the crime or not.34 A powerful State could have any State
within its sphere of influence that is a party to the Rome Statute initiate
prosecution under article 14 . Many States that are parties to the Rome
Statute might also initiate a prosecution in this situation as a matter of
principle.
Even if a person who is not a national of a State Party commits a
crime, a State which is not a party to the Rome Statute can force prose-
cution by consenting to the jurisdiction of the ICC only for a specific
past incident. 36 In addition to jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
criminal, the ICC has jurisdiction based on the locale where the crime is
committed.37 Once it accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC for this specific
crime, a non-party State has all the benefits of a State Party to the Rome
Statute.38 Article 11(2) makes it plain that a non-party State can decide to
waive sovereignty and submit to the jurisdiction of the ICC for a specific
crime after that crime has been committed.39
It is also possible that the ICC Prosecutor might initiate prosecution.
The Pre-Trial Chamber is supposed to provide a check on the independ-
ent Prosecutor.4° The concern is that the Prosecutor might choose cases
for their political rather than judicial merits.4 ' However, the Pre-Trial
Chamber looks only to whether there is "a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation" and whether "the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the court. 42 It is not delineated in the statute that the
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber should look outside the four corners of
the case to the political considerations behind the investigation 3 Perhaps
a custom will develop that allows the Pre-Trial Chamber to block
32. Id. art. 12(2). See id. art. 5 for the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction.
33. Id. art. 9.
34. Id. art. 14.
35. See id.
36. See id. art. 12(3).
37. Id. art. 12(2).
38. Id. art. 12(3).
39. "[T]he court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration
under article 12, paragraph 3." Id. art. 11(2).
40. The Pre-Trial Chamber makes the determination whether the Prosecutor's allega-
tions warrant a trial before the ICC. Id. art. 15.
41. E.g., Dianne Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002).
42. Rome Statute art. 15(4).
43. Id.
Winter 20031
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prosecutions for political or fairness reasons, but it is not encapsulated in
the Rome Statute." As long as the case has merit, it is not currently the
duty of the Pre-Trial Chamber to screen for political motivations in the
cases actually brought before it."
In this way, a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute can gain
all of the benefits of ratifying it without any of the burdens. The ICC can
punish genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in
the non-party State by foreigners. However, the non-party State citizens
are immune from punishment under the Rome Statute as long as they
commit crimes against their own nationals. This creates fairness prob-
lems on two levels. First, a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute
will have the support of the international community to enforce the stan-
dards of the ICC on others without any promise or accountability to
conform to the standards itself. Second, the justice meted out for crimes
within a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute could differ dra-
matically depending on the nationality of the perpetrators. This will be
especially true in States that traditionally have not met and do not meet
their human rights obligations to their nationals.
Michael Summers offers a cautionary tale from another context.
During the Kosovo conflict, NATO began a bombing campaign in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During this campaign, the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia filed a declaration accepting the International Court
of Justice's (ICJ) jurisdiction in order to sue NATO for an injunction
against its bombing campaign in Serbia. 6 In the lawsuit, the ICJ was
able to duck the issue by claiming its jurisdiction extended only from the
time Yugoslavia ratified 7
If the ICJ had not been able to avoid the case, it would have been
faced with two unfavorable choices. It could have found the heads of
NATO guilty of war crimes, or it could have found a principle of cus-
tomary international law that allowed humanitarian intervention without
the approval of the United Nations Security Council. 48 Neither of these
44. See Timothy L.H. McCormack & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the
Rome Statute for the New International Criminal Court, 23 MELB. U. L. REv. 635, 642-43
(1999).
45. Id. Countries which favored the inclusion of an independent Prosecutor viewed the
position as a victory in the battle to establish an independent Court. They saw the Prosecutor's
ability to act independently as a way to "help assuage concerns about the inherently political
considerations of the UN Security Council as well as individual states." Id. at 643. This sug-
gests that at least these State Parties to the Rome Statute do not want the Pre-Trial Chamber to
reintroduce political considerations.
46. Summers, supra note 23, at 72.
47. Id. at 72-74. The ICJ said that since the bombings commenced before Yugoslavia
consented to ICJ jurisdiction, which act created the jurisdictional nexus for the case, the ICJ




options would have helped the political situation or enhanced the future
credibility of the ICJ.
49
The ICC, however, will not be able to avoid hearing political cases
by limiting its jurisdiction to the period after ratification. The Rome
Statute specifically allows States to accept its jurisdiction over crimes
that have already been committed. °
The jurisdiction of the ICC is widely described as stemming from
the notion of universal jurisdiction.5' The idea is that all States are com-
ing together to prosecute crimes that any could prosecute singly without
a need for the Rome Statute or any other treaty. 2 However, there is only
one instance where that truly applies under the Rome Statute; when a
crime is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
its Chapter VII powers.5' This is the only instance where consent of at
least one State with territorial or nationality connections to the crime is
not required.54
There are serious fairness issues in allowing this method of prosecu-
tion. There is no requirement that the members of the Security Council
have signed or ratified the Rome Statute. 5 Several permanent members
of the Security Council have not, in fact, ratified the Rome Statute 6
These States have not accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over their own
nationals.57 However, they can force another State that has not ratified the
Rome Statute to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over its nationals. 8 In
other words, powerful States can force less powerful States to accept the
jurisdiction of the ICC while keeping their nationals immune.
This is particularly pertinent to permanent members of the Security
Council because they have veto power over the Security Council's deci-
sions.59 To give the ICC jurisdiction over a matter, the Security Council is
49. Id.
50. Rome Statute arts. 12(3), 11(2).
51. See, e.g., SADAT, supra note 14; Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the US Position, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67,
76 (2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/64LCPScharf.
52. See Scharf, supra note 51, at 76-110.
53. Rome Statute art. 13(b).
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, China, the United States, and
the Russian Federation have yet to ratify. Of the elected members in 2003, Angola, Cameroon,
Chile, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, and the Syrian Arab Republic have not ratified. Ratification
Status of the Rome Statute, supra note 10; Membership and Presidency of the Security Coun-
cil in 2003, at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscmembers.html.
57. Id.
58. Rome Statute art. 13.
59. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty, Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
506, 506 (1995).
Winter 20031
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required to pass a resolution under its Chapter VII powers.6° Therefore,
there is no avenue by which a permanent member of the Security Coun-
cil's nationals can be punished for crimes within the permanent member's
borders without its consent, absent its ratification of the Rome Statute.
In terms of political reality, this probably makes little difference. The
permanent members of the Security Council that have not ratified the
Rome Statute are unlikely to ratify any treaty that requires them to give
up their Heads of State to an international criminal tribunal of any sort.
Even if any of them did ratify the Rome Treaty, none of them could be
compelled by force to, and probably would not, give over their nationals
to the tribunal.
Symbolically, however, the jurisdictional elements of the Rome
Statute send an unfortunate message. The Rome Statute purports to ap-
ply international standards of justice to a criminal tribunal.6' The treaty
allows States that are not a party to the ICC to enjoy all of the benefits of
the treaty for any situation they choose. However, if a State is a perma-
nent member of the Security Council, its nationals are granted immunity
from the jurisdiction of the ICC for crimes committed against its own
citizens as long as the State refuses to ratify the Rome Statute.
It also says that persistent bad actors in powerful countries can es-
cape punishment for crimes which bad actors in less powerful countries
cannot. In fact, persistent bad actors whose nations have a seat on the
Security Council can vote to have other bad actors from less powerful
countries indicted for crimes the international community knows that
they themselves have committed and do commit. It is troubling that this
reality should be enshrined in a treaty text and presented as an ideal for
international justice.
III. JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Crimes against humanity, while recognized since the Nuremberg tri-
als, 62 had never before been defined in a universal multilateral treaty.
63
60. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an
International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National
Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 21-22 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002). Chapter VII requires
a determination that there has been a breach of the peace, aggression, or a threat of a breach of
the peace. Such a resolution requires the affirmative vote of nine members, which can be over-
ridden by a veto. Id.
61. See Rome Statute pmbl.
62. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc A/64Add.1 (1946).
63. Murphy, supra note 7, at 54.
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There was no general agreement, in either treaty or customary law, on
what constituted such crimes. 4 All of the States involved in the negotia-
tion of the Rome Statute agreed that crimes against humanity should be
included in the statute.65 However, there was also an understanding that
the Rome Statute's definition of crimes against humanity would be re-
garded as definitive.66 There was wide disagreement over the range of
crimes that should be included in the Rome Statute.67
All of the State negotiators agreed that inhumane acts had to pass a
certain threshold to become a crime against humanity in the international
setting.' Criminalization of murder, for instance, was not the issue. In-
stead, the issue was determining at what point the international
community had the right and the obligation to step in and prosecute
murders committed by an actor.69 One group of States initially argued for
the approach taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, which had no statutory jurisdictional threshold. 70 However,
the delegates eventually agreed that the threshold test should incorporate
terms used in previous jurisprudence and commentary, namely "wide-
spread" and "systematic."7'
The controversy then shifted to whether these requirements would
be conjunctive (the action must be both widespread and systematic) or
disjunctive (the action must be either widespread or systematic)." One
group of States argued that a disjunctive requirement was already estab-
lished under international law. They pointed to the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which required that the acts
be committed as "part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population."'3
Another group of States, led by members of the Security Council,
but comprising a large number of Arab and Asian States, believed that a
disjunctive test would be overinclusive. 4 They had some concern that a
64. Id.
65. McCormack & Robertson, supra note 44, at 651.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. SADAT, supra note 14, at 148-49.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 152.
71. Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 47 (1999).
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, Annex, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994),
amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1 165
(1998); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1329 (2000),
available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
74. Robinson, supra note 71, at 47.
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widespread but unrelated series of actions could be understood as a
crime against humanity for the purpose of the statute; a result that was
not supported by previous conceptions of international law. 75 The United
States was also concerned that such a definition might include recent
actions like the bombings in Afghanistan and the Sudan.76
With these differences seemingly irreconcilable, Canada submitted
language that it felt embraced a reasonable compromise between the po-
sitions.77 Ultimately, this language, with some modifications, was used
for the definition of crimes against humanity.8 Unfortunately, the solu-
tion in this instance was worse than the problem as the final language
allows for a bevy of contradictory interpretations.
The first difficulty is in the interpretation of the terms "widespread"
and "systematic." This is difficult because these terms are expected to be
read together to create a standard, rather than conform strictly to their
dictionary definitions. 79 A comprehensive treatment of the language,
clearly illustrating this point, was promulgated by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blaskic.80 The tribunal said,
The systematic character refers to the four elements which for
the purposes of this case may be expressed as follows:
" the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which
the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of
the word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a commu-
nity;
" the perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against
a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous commis-
sion of inhumane acts linked to one another;
" the preparation and use of significant public or private re-
sources, whether military or other;
75. Id.
76. Murphy, supra note 7, at 54.
77. MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLUM
SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (2002).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 479; see also Robinson, supra note 71, at 47-50.
80. See BOOT, supra note 77, at 479.
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* the implication of high level political and/or military authori-
ties in the definition and establishment of the methodical
plan.8
The tribunal declared that the plan "need not necessarily be declared
expressly or even stated clearly and precisely. It may be surmised from
the occurrence of a series of events" and then went on to list possible
examples.82 It also emphasized that such a plan need not "be conceived at
the highest level of State machinery.
' 83
The tribunal is even less precise when defining "widespread. ''" 4 It
creates a vague standard that relies primarily on exclusion rather than
inclusion. "Widespread," the Court said, "refers to the scale of the acts
perpetrated and to the number of victims."85 The Court explicitly refer-
enced both the Draft Code of the International Law Commission and
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic in determining that "a crime may be wide-
spread or committed on a large-scale by the cumulative effect of a series
of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordi-
nary magnitude. 86 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic states, and the tribunal in
Blaskic agrees, that the term "widespread" "excludes an isolated inhu-
mane act committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and
directed against a single victim."87
Other commentators have been equally vague when defining wide-
spread and systematic. For instance, Leila Sadat leaves both words
undefined in her discussion of crimes against humanity in the Rome
Statute. Machteld Boot cites the Blaskic judgment for a definition of
systematic, and says, "the widespread characteristic ... refers to the
scale of the acts perpetrated or the number of victims. '89 Darryl Robin-
son defines widespread as "a high-threshold test, requiring a substantial
number of victims and massive, frequent, large-scale action." 9 He sees
systematic as "requiring some element of scale ... a course of conduct






86. Id. T 206. (internal quotations omitted). The Draft Code was the starting point for
the drafting of the Rome Statute. See Daniel Bodansky et al., Counterintuiting Countermea-
sures, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 817 (2002).
87. Blaskic, 1206.
88. See SADAT, supra note 14, at 148-60.
89. BOOT, supra note 77, at 479.
90. Robinson, supra note 71, at 48 (intemal quotations omitted). Robinson was a mem-
ber of the Canadian delegation, which proposed the compromise language. Id.
Winter 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
involving multiple crimes."9 Joshua Bardavid merely restates the propo-
sition that widespread and systematic "eliminates minor and isolated
incidents from the jurisdiction of the court." 92 McCormack and Robert-
son say that widespread refers to the scale of the attack "not an isolated
act but a large scale action directed against multiple victims."' System-
atic "carries a connotation of premeditation by an organized group-an
attack carefully planned and undertaken as part of a common policy.
' 94
The ambiguous definitions of the terms make the assessment of the
jurisdictional nexus of crimes against humanity difficult. The wording of
the Rome Statute adds to the confusion because the compromise lan-
guage makes the application of the terminology subject to multiple
interpretations.
Crimes against humanity are defined in article 7 of the Rome Stat-
ute.9' Article 7(1) reads, in pertinent part, "any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
Murder...
Torture
Rape ... or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity.
96
This language appears to create a disjunctive requirement-the acts
must be either widespread or systematic. However, when reading article
7(1) in conjunction with article 7(2)(a), the requirements of the jurisdic-
tional threshold become unclear.97 Article 7(2) is the definitional section
of article 7 of the Rome Statute. 9 Article 7(1) reads "[flor the purpose of
this Statute, 'crime against humanity' means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."99 Article
7(2)(a), on the other hand, reads "If]or the purpose of paragraph 1: (a)
'attack directed against any civilian population' means a course of con-
duct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
91. Idat 51.
92. Joshua Bardavid, The Failure of the State-Centric Model of International Law and
the International Criminal Court, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 9 (2002). Bardavid was a delegate to
the United Nations 9th Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court. Id.
93. McCormack & Robertson, supra note 44, at 653.
94. Id.
95. Rome Statute art. 7.
96. Id.
97. Payam Akhavan, Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to Development of Definitions of Crimes Against Humanity
and Genocide, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 279, 280 (2000).
98. Rome Statute art. 7(2).
99. Rome Statute art. 7(I).
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against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack."' °
This language has given rise to multiple interpretations of the re-
quirements for an act or acts to rise to the level of a crime against
humanity that can be heard by the ICC. Commentators in the current
literature take one of three positions. They believe that the requirement is
either conjunctive, disjunctive, or some compromise position between
the two.
Leila Sadat uses a strict reading of the chapeau to article 7(1) to ar-
gue that the requirements are disjunctive.' In support of her position,
she references the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, which explicitly contains disjunctive language, and the position
of the Tadic case.' 2 Several other commentators follow this position.
0 3
McCormack and Robertson, however, take the view that article 7(1)
must be read in conjunction with article 7(a)(2) to pass the threshold re-
quirement for acceptance to the ICC.' 4 They express the threshold in the
following way:
The particular acts must have been committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population where such an attack is understood to mean a course
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State of organizational policy to commit such
attack. 05
100. Rome Statute art. 7(2)(a).
101. SADAT, supra note 14, at 152.
102. Id. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was very influen-
tial in the process of creating the Rome Statute. Some procedural, electoral, and financial
aspects of the Rome Statute were explicitly modeled on those of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. McCormack & Roberton, supra note 44, at 638. The Tadic case was also
very influential in the creation of the Rome Statute. See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Paradox of
International Adjudication: Development in the International Criminal Tribunals of the For-
mer Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the International Criminal Court, 25
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 551, 593 (2000); see also John L. Washburn, What Lessons Can
Be Learned from the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals?, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 28-
30 (2002).
103. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements
of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307, 314-16 (2000); Jelena Pejic,
The United States and the International Criminal Court: One Loophole Too Many, 78 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 267, 277 (2001).
104. McCormack & Robertson, supra note 44, at 654.
105. Id. (internal quotations to the Rome Statute article 7(2) omitted).
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They believe that it will be insufficient for the Prosecutor to show only
one index of gravity; he or she must show that the act in question is both
widespread and systematic.'0
Boot agrees that "although many were pleased to have won the battle
over the words 'widespread' and 'systematic' as alternative requirements
... the interpretation of Article 7 as a whole reveals that the require-
ments are conjunctive, requiring a state or organizational policy.''0 7 He
believes that this should present little difficulty, though, since "it is
hardly conceivable that such crimes are committed systematically with-
out being widespread at the same time."' '
A third group of commentators believes that the Rome Statute cre-
ates a compromise between the two positions. Unfortunately, they do not
agree on precisely what that compromise entails. The more authoritative
suggestion comes from Darryl Robinson, who was a part of the Cana-
dian delegation when the Canadian compromise was suggested.'09
Darryl Robinson suggests that the language of article 7 introduces a
policy requirement."0 Policy is not limited to that of a State, but needs to
be more than the work of isolated individuals."' The Rome Statute also
requires a multiplicity of acts."2 He believes that this requires that
[t]he prosecution must establish an 'attack directed against any
civilian population,' which involves multiple acts and a policy
element (a conjunctive but low threshold test), and show that the
attack was either widespread or systematic (higher threshold but
disjunctive alternatives). If the prosecutor chooses to prove the
"widespread" element, the concern about completely unrelated
acts is addressed, because of the policy element. If the prosecu-
tor chooses to prove the "systematic" element, some element of
scale must still be shown before ICC jurisdiction is warranted,
because a course of conduct involving multiple crimes is re-
quired.' "
In another attempt to read a compromise into the language of article
7, Beth Van Schaack looks to the language of article 7(1) and argues that
the nexus is disjunctive. However, in order for the ICC to have jurisdic-
106. Id. at 654.
107. BOOT, supra note 77, at 533.
108. Id.
109. Robinson, supra note 71, at 43 n.al. However, it should be noted that there were
some modifications to the Canadian proposal's language before it was adopted as part of the
Rome Statute. E.g., BOOT, supra note 77, at 477.
110. Robinson, supra note 71, at 48-52.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 51.
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tion over an individual, that individual must "knowingly contribute to the
attack." She regards mens rea as a jurisdictional, rather than a proof ele-
ment of a crime against humanity.'"
4
All of these arguments appear plausible, at least on their face. It is
not the purpose of this Note to select any of them as the correct ap-
proach. Rather, they illustrate the difficulty in determining the exact
definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda spurred
on the formation of the ICC."5 The desire for an international criminal
court had percolated through the international community since the Nur-
emberg trials."6 While the preparation for the Rome Statute took years,
the actual convention that led to its adoption lasted only five weeks."7
Since many areas of the Rome Statute were controversial, much of the
language was changed during these weeks."' It is therefore not surpris-
ing that some of the language is less precise than lawyers might wish.
However, this is the language of the treaty as it now stands. Chang-
ing any of the language of the Rome Statute requires a two-thirds
majority vote of its members.'' 9 Caught between delegates from States
that wanted the ICC to be a supranational body with universal jurisdic-
tion and delegates from States who resisted the idea of non-treaty parties
being subject to the ICC, the Rome Statute ended up with a sloppy com-
promise which created the potential for exploitation of the ICC by
powerful countries and those that act in bad faith.' 20 On its face, the
Rome Statute rewards bad actor States that persistently refuse to ratify it,
especially powerful ones.
The current definition of crimes against humanity is as problematic.
Since an accepted international definition of crimes against humanity did
not exist, the delegates created one for the statute.' 2' Unfortunately, the
114. Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving Their
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787, 788, 844-45 (1999).
115. See, e.g., McCormack & Robertson, supra note 44, at 638.
116. E.g., Bruce Broomhall, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Look-
ing Forward to the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Between State Consent
and the Rule of Law, 8 CRIM. L. F. 317, 318 (1997).
117. Bardavid, supra note 92, at 10.
118. Marcus R. Mumford, Building on a Foundation of Sand: A Commentary on the
International Court Treaty Conference, 85 INT'L L. & PRAC. 151 (1999).
119. Rome Statute arts. 9, 112.
120. For a discussion on the negotiation that took place over the jurisdictional issues, see
Podgers, supra note 15; Mumford, supra note 118, at 170-90.
121. See BOOT, supra note 77.
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language is unclear enough that every commentator can argue that it en-
shrines his or her position as a principle of international law.'
2
Certainly these issues will be resolved over time as various cases
come before the ICC.' However, one can sympathize with those com-
mentators who want to see the ICC in action before they endorse it.' 24
The fairness issues inherent in the language itself could pale beside the
fairness issues of the administration of the court.' 2' Ratification by the
remaining permanent members of the Security Council would give the
ICC both legitimacy and powers that are unprecedented in international
criminal law. Perhaps it is better for these members, as well as for the
state of international law itself, that these countries see the ICC in action
before committing themselves.
122. See, e.g., SADAT, supra note 14, at 148-60; McCormack & Robertson, supra note
44, at 654.
123. Even before Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo was elected Prosecutor of the ICC, the Ivory
Coast had already announced its intention to ask the ICC for assistance in punishing rebels in
an internal dispute. Mark John & Sylvia Aloisi, Ivory Coast Seeks Global Criminal Court
Probe, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003, available at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story
&u=/nm/20030227/wl-nm/rights-ivorycoast dc-3. Several NGOs have also called for the
prosecution of various Heads of State for crimes against humanity. See, e.g., International Bar
Association Calls for International Criminal Court to Investigate and Try Robert Mugabe,
(Mar. 6, 2003), at http://allafrica.com/stories/200303060482.html.
124. E.g., Alan Dershowitz, Back the World Court?, JD JUNGLE, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 26
(arguing that the United States should wait to ratify the Rome Statute until there is some evi-
dence that the ICC will "serve objective, universal justice.") Id.
125. Mumford, for instance, points out that while only seven States voted against the
Rome Statute in 1998, those States represented more than 50 percent of the world's popula-
tion. Mumford, supra note 118, at 186-89.
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